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SELECTED PROBLEMS IN WRAP-
AROUND FINANCING: SUGGESTED 
APPROACHES TO DUE-ON-SALE 
CLAUSES AND PURCHASER'S 
DEPRECIABLE BASIS 
Sanford M. Guerin* 
The wrap-around ("WA") mortgage has become in recent 
years a predominant force in real estate financing, despite a gen-
eral misunderstanding of its unique financial characteristics 
among the judiciary, the Internal Revenue Service, and tax-
payers seeking to utilize it.1 This misunderstanding has resulted 
in an uncertain and inconsistent application of the law to a sub-
stantial number of wrap-around financed sales. Despite the un-
certainty, however, increasing numbers of sellers employ wrap-
around financing, either because of financial preference or eco-
nomic necessity. 
The WA-financed installment sale offers benefits to both pur-
chaser and seller which are unavailable under conventional 
financing methods.l1 The purchaser benefits primarily from flex-
• Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., 1971, Boston Uni-
versity; J.D., 1974, University of San Francisco; L.L.M., 1975, New York University. 
' A WA mortgage is a loan equal to the existing mortgage plus any additional cash 
advanced by the lender. A WA mortgage may be used as a purchase money loan or as a 
refinancing technique. The principle, however, is the same in both situations. When the 
bonower makes payments on the WA mortgage, the lender is required by the WA agree-
ment to make payments on the first mortgage. This allows the bonower to obtain a loan 
below market rates while insuring an above-market return to the seller. 
Consider the following example: A owrui Blackacre, valued at $100,000, with an ad-
justed basis of $30,000, and encumbered by a first mortgage of $70,000 bearing interest 
at the rate of 9% per annum. B would like to buy Blackacre but he has no money for a 
down payment, and cannot afford the cunent 15 % mortgage rate. A could offer B a WA 
mortgage for the full $100,000 at 12% per annum. A's investment in the property would 
be $30,000 (the actual amount of money loaned by A). For each year of the WA mort-
gage, A will receive interest income of $12,000 ($100,000 X 12%) while paying out $6,300 
($70,000 X 9%) on the first mortgage. This would give A a gain of $5,700 - a net return 
on his investment of 19%. See note 3 infra. 
The original mortgagee in this example would understandably feel left out, because it 
is saddled with a 9% return. To avoid this result, it will attempt to call in the first 
mortgage through a "due-on-sale" acceleration claim in the original agreement. See pt. Il 
infra. 
• A review of the conventional options in a real estate disposition illustrates why real 
estate purchasers and sellers are finding WA-mortgage financing increasingly attractive, 
and at times essential. Using again the example presented in note 1 supra, the sale can 
401 
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' 
ibility in negotiating financing terms. Because the seller is not 
constrained by the statutory limits on borrowing applicable to 
commercial lenders, he can allow a purchaser to make a smaller 
cash downpayment and obtain a larger loan than the purchaser 
could obtain from an institutional lender. In addition, negotiat-
ing a loan with a life in excess of a conventional mortgage or 
with an increasing interest rate can decrease the amount of the 
purchaser's debt service in the early years. Use of a wrap-around 
also enables the purchaser to avoid paying "points," or other 
loan origination fees, customarily charged by institutional lend-
ers. Moreover, in some situations, the WA mortgage may be the 
only financing available, either because of a tight money supply. 
or because a purchaser's poor credit rating disqualifies him from 
obtaining conventional financing. 
Comparable advantages accrue to the seller utilizing a WA 
mortgage arrangement. The seller can enhance·the marketability 
of his property by tailoring the mortgage to suit the purchaser's 
needs. In addition, a WA mortgage may be the only means for a 
be accomplished by one of three conventional methods. 
First, the purchaser can pay cash for the entire purchase price, with the seller retiring 
the $70,000 mortgage with the proceeds. This arrangement may be disadvantageous to 
the seller, because he will be taxable in a single year on the $70,000 gain while only 
receiving $30,000 in cash. Assuming the purchaser utilizes his own-funds, the transaction 
is financially undesirable from his viewpoint because it provides no leverage. H a WA 
mortgage were used, the seller would recognize as taxable gain only that amount of each 
monthly payment attributable to the $30,000 he actually advanced. This allows the seller 
to spread his taxable gain over a longer time period. The purchaser would benefit as well, 
because he still would have his money to use for other investments. 
Second, the purchaser can pay a small percentage of the sales price to the seller, and 
borrow the balance from a third-party lending institution. The purchaser may encounter 
difficulty in qualifying for financing, or may be forced to pay an excessive interest rate. 
Moreover, as in the first alternative, the seller will have to report his entire taxable gain 
in the year of sale. In contrast, under a WA-financing scheme the purchaser would need 
only to satisfy the seller's qualifications, and upon satisfaction of those qualifications 
could obtain a loan at below the market interest rate. 
Third, the sale can be structured as an installment sale under I.R.C. § 453, with the 
purchaser assuming the existing mortgage while paying cash and a note to the seller in 
exchange for his equity in the property. One obvious problem with this method would 
arise where the purchaser has insufficient cash to cover the seller's equity, necessitating 
secondary financing. This transaction nonetheless may be preferable to the above two 
alternatives because it permits the seller to report as income only a portion of each pay-
ment received, thus allowing him to spread his taxable gain over the years of payment on 
the note. The installment sale also provides the purchaser with increased leverage. 
Under this method of reporting gain, however, the assumption of the seller's indebted-
ness in excess of his adjusted basis is deemed a "constructive payment," thus being 
treated as a taxable payment in the year of sale even though no cash is received. There-
fore, if the purchaser either assumes the seller's mortgage or takes the property subject 
to the mortgage, the amount in excess of basis, $40,000, constitutes a taxable payment in 
the year of sale. A WA mortgage, while still enabling the benefits of § 453 installment 
sales, would avoid this problem of constructive payment. 
SPRING 1981) Wrap-Around Financing 403 
seller to avoid a large prepayment penalty, or to sell property 
encumbered by a "locked in" loan. Moreover, and perhaps most 
significantly, the leverage in the WA arrangement enables the 
seller to earn income from the interest rate based on the 
unadvanced funds - that portion of the WA mortgage which 
equals the unpaid balance on the senior mortgage - in addition 
to· the interest income received on the equity advanced to the 
purchaser.8 Finally, if the purchaser does not assume the ex-
isting mortgage or take the property subject to that mortgage, 
the WA mortgage may eliminate a constructive payment in the 
year of sale. while decreasing the percentage of income to be re-
ported by the seller on the receipt of each installment payment. 
Although WA mortgage financing has reached near epidemic 
proportions, its use remains clouded by judicial uncertainty. For 
example, "due-on-sale" or "due-on-encumbrance" clauses, often 
employed by institutional lenders to prevent WA financing, have 
been inconsistently analyzed and enforced by the courts. Addi-
tionally, no cases or guidelines exist for evaluating whether a 
WA mortgage should be included in the purchaser's depreciable 
basis. Despite the obvious hazards,• however, and the fact that 
taxpayers cannot be assured of the results from a particular WA 
transaction, an increasing number of taxpayers have deemed the 
advantages, or perhaps the necessities, of employing WA financ-
ing as sufficiently attractive to justify the uncertainties. 
This article will address two unresolved issues surrounding the 
WA transaction which result from the inherent flexibility availa-
ble for negotiating financing terms in the absence of an institu-
tional lender. Part I discusses the circumstances warranting ex-
clusion of the WA loan from the purchaser's depreciable basis. 
• This transaction creates financial leverage for the seller. Leverage arises when funds 
are bonowed at a given percentage and then loaned at a specified rate. When the cost of 
bonowing is less than the income earned by loaning the bonowed funds, there is "posi-
tive leverage." "Negative leverage" occurs when the cost of bonowing exceeds the return 
available for those dollars. Leverage thus describes the use of another's money to in-
crease one's own return. 
For instance, in the example set forth in note 1 supra, the seller is receiving 12% 
interest on the full $100,000 WA mortgage, while actually lending only $30,000. The re-
maining $70,000, the outstanding balance on the first mortgage, is subject only to a 9% 
interest rate. This combination createa an effective interest rate of 19% - the interest 
income of $12,000, less the interest payments of $6,300, produces a net interest income of 
$5,700, or a 19% earning on the $30,000 loan. Thus the seller enjoys positive leverage. 
• A further difficulty may be presented when sellers fail to adhere meticulously to the 
Tax Court's uncertain guidelines, which could cause the purchaser to be treated as hav-
ing "assumed" or taken the property "subject to" the existing mortgage. Either outcome 
could result in a constructive payment in the year of sale, and a modification to the 
seller.'s profit-reporting percentage. 
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Part II addresses whether, and when, a due-on-sale clause in the 
senior mortgage should negate the possibility of utilizing WA 
financing. 
I. INCLUSION OF THE WRAP-AROUND IN THE PURCHASER'S BASIS 
The law permits a depreciation deduction for property used in 
a trade or business, or held for investment.0 Because deprecia-
tion can be taken only to the extent of the owner's basis in the 
property, it behooves the owner to maximize his basis. Thus, the 
WA-financed purchaser will seek to include the amount of the 
WA mortgage in his depreciable basis, in order to receive depre-
ciation deductions exceeding his cash investment. in the prop-
erty. The flexibility available to parties negotiating WA-financ-
ing terms, however, engenders substantial uncertainty regarding 
the purchaser's ability to maximize his depreciable basis by in-
cluding the WA mortgage. For example, no-money-down 100% 
WA financing6 might prevent inclusion of the WA mortgage in 
the purchaser's depreciable basis. Furthermore, uncertainty ex-
ists regarding the significance of whether the purchase-money 
WA loan is nonrecourse, of whether the term of the loan exceeds 
the useful life of the property, and of whether the purchase price 
exceeds the fair market value of the property.7 · 
Although no court has addressed these questions specifically 
with respect to WA financing, a line of cases dealing with 
purchase-money mortgages and sale-leaseback arrangements es-
tablish general principles for inclusion of a purchase-money loan 
in a purchaser's cost basis. These rules should also apply to 
• I.R.C. § 167. Depreciation is not allowed for property used for personal purposes. 
Accordingly, the discussion in Part I is limited to WA mortgages employed for purchas-
ing trade or business property, or property held for investment. This is not to imply, 
however, that WA financing is used more extensively in commercial, as opposed to non-
commercial, purchases. The benefits of WA mortgages, see notes 2-3 and accompanying 
text supra, apply with equal force to purchasers of property intended for personal use. 
• For an example of a 100% WA mortgage, see note 1 supra. 
7 This last device, if successful, would result in income tax savings to both purchaser 
and seller. A stated purchase price in excess of the fair market value of the property 
would provide the purchaser with a higher depreciable basis in the property - equal to 
the stated purchase price. The seller could report a portion of each payment received as 
capital gain, rather than ordinary income, by trading the higher purchase price for a 
lower interest rate on the mortgage. In such a case, however, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice could argue that the amount exceeding the fair market value of property represents 
a loan discount. Under this reasoning, the purchaser would be prevented from including 
the excess in his basis and would therefore amortize the discount amount over the term 
of the loan. The seller would then recognize ordinary income on each payment in an 
amount equal to the portion of each payment attributable to the discount. 
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purchase-money WA loans. There is no reason to distinguish be-
tween WA purchase-money mortgages and non-WA purchase-
money mortgages in this context, because both represent the 
purchaser's cost for the property. Several unique aspects of WA-
financing transactions must be viewed within the framework of 
these general rules, however, to determine if the WA mortgage 
presents any special problems for the purchaser. For example, 
the use of a land sale contract, under which title does not pass 
until the debt is satisfied in full, might affect the purchaser's 
ability to include the WA mortgage in his basis. Furthermore, 
inclusion of the WA mortgage in the purchaser's depreciable ba-
sis might be ,precluded where the combined face amount of the 
purchaser's WA mortgage and the seller's senior mortgage ex-
ceed the fair market value of the property. Analysis of the ratio-
nales underlying a purchaser's ability to include a mortgage in 
his basis provides answers to these concerns. 
A. Rules Regarding Depreciable Basis 
1. The Crane rule- Internal Revenue Code section 167(g) 
provides that, for purposes of depreciation, the basis of property 
is the adjusted basis set forth in section 1011 for determining 
gain or loss on the sale or disposition of such property.8 Section 
lOll(a) provides that the basis of .property is to be determined 
under section 1012,9 which states that "[t]he basis of property 
shall be the cost of such property."10 The regulations provide 
that, in general, the cost of property is the amount paid for the 
property in cash or other property.11 Thus, a purchaser's depre-
ciable basis in property is generally the amount paid for the 
property. A line of cases beginning with Crane v. Commis-
sioner11 establishes that the "amount paid" for property, for 
purposes of depreciation and for computing gain or loss on the 
sale of the property, includes the full amount of any debt "as-
sumed or taken subject to." · 
In Crane, the taxpayer inherited real property encumbered by 
a mortgage equal to the fair market value of the property. The 
mortgage was never assumed by the taxpayer and remained out-
standing until the taxpayer's subsequent sale of the property. In 
• I.R.C. § 167(g). 
• I.R.C. § lOll(a). 
10 I.R.C. § 1012. 
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-l(a) (1957). 
11 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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computing gain on the disposition of the property, the taxpayer 
used a zero valuation for her basis on the theory that, because 
the mortgage equaled the value of the property she inherited, 
she originally acquired no equity in the property. She paid tax 
on the amount reflecting the difference between her equity in 
the property at the· time of the sale and her zero "basis" in the 
property. The Commissioner contended that the taxpayer's basis 
in the property, for purposes of computing gain or loss on the 
sale, should be the full value of the property, including the 
amount of the mortgage.18 The Court upheld the Commissioner, 
finding that inclusion of the mortgage in the taxpayer's basis 
was offset by the fact that the taxpayer must also include the 
full mortgage amount in the amount realized on the sale of the 
property subject to the mortgage. H 
The Crane rule may be justified most easily where the terms 
of the note and mortgage make the buyer personally liable for 
the debt amount, as the buyer will be required to pay the debt 
in the event of default and subsequent foreclosure.16 The Crane 
•• In Crane, the taxpayer's method resulted in a computed gain of $2,500 (the tax-
payer's sale price minus her zero basis), whereas the Commissioner's approach resulted 
in a computed gain of over $24,000. Under the Commissioner's approach, the taxpayer's 
adjusted basis was found to equal only the fair market value at the time of acquisition 
(which happened to equal the encumbrance on the property) less the allowable deprecia-
tion. To arrive at the gain realized, the adjusted basis was then subtracted from the sale 
price, which the Commissioner asserted was equal to the cash received by the taxpayer 
plus the outstanding balance of the encumbrance. The Commissioner and the Court re-
duced the taxpayer's basis by the allowable depreciation of approximately $25,000 
(which, indeed, the taxpayer had claimed during her term of ownership) under the lan-
guage of § 113(b)(l)(B) of the Revenue Act of 1938, then in effect, which provided that 
"proper adjustment in respect of the property shall in all cases be made . . . for exhaus-
tion, wear and tear ... to the extent allowed (but not less than the amount allow-
able) . ... "Id.at 11 (second emphasis added). (The Commissioner's computed gain was 
only $24,000 because additional interest on the outstanding encumbrance had accrued 
during the taxpayer's term of ownership.) 
,. In rejecting a definition of basis which included only the taxpayer's equity in the 
property, the Court noted the effect of such a construction on the allowance of deprecia-
tion deductions and corresponding adjustments to basis for wear and tear on the prop-
erty. If depreciation is computed upon the taxpayer's equity basis, the taxpayer would be 
allowed only a portion of the actual wear and tear. On the other hand, if depreciation is 
computed on the full value of the property, but subtracted from the equity basis, the 
deductions might eventually yield a negative basis. Further, the use of an equity basis 
would require that the basis be altered with each mortgage payment, creating a tremen-
dous accounting burden for both the Commissioner and the taxpayer. This led the Court 
to conclude that the basis in property must include the full amount of any mortgage 
thereon. 
'" Contrast this result to the situation where the buyer takes the property subject to 
the mortgage. In this latter situation, the buyer simply may walk away from the property 
in the event of default and incur no personal liability. Under these circumstances, it is 
more difficult to conceive the nonrecourse mortgage as part of the buyer's "cost" of the 
property. 
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court refused to distinguish between recourse and nonrecourse 
debt, however, reasoning that the tax result is the same upon 
ultimate sale of the property regardless of whether the seller is 
personally liable for the debt.18 
2. Nonrecourse loans- Nineteen years after Crane, the Tax 
Court, in Mayerson v. Commissioner,11 applied the Crane rule to 
nonrecourse purchase-money mortgages. In Mayerson, the tax-
payer purchased depreciable real property for a minimal down-
payment and a substantial nonrecourse purchase money mort-
gage. The term of the mortgage was ninety-nine years, with a 
specified amount of interest to be paid annually in fixed 
monthly installments. Under the terms of the mortgage, sub-
stantial reductions in the purchase price were offered in the 
event the buyer made full payment of the purchase price in ei-
ther of the. first two years following the sale, although repayment 
of principal was not required before the due date ninety-nine 
years hence. The taxpayer was not personally obligated under 
the note for any repayment of principal; in the event of default 
the seller could foreclose only against the property. 
The taxpayer included the full amount of the mortgage in the 
property's basis and computed his depreciation deductions using 
that amount. The Commissioner argued that the lengthy term of 
the mortgage and the unusual nature of many of its provisions, 
especially its nonrecourse nature, indicated the taxpayer had 
made no capital investment in the property.18 The Commis-
sioner claimed that because the taxpayer was not personally lia-
ble for repayment of any principal amount of the mortgage, no 
debt was created - therefore the taxpayer should not be al-
lowed to include the purported debt in calculating his deprecia-
ble basis. Further, the Commissioner argued that the obligation, 
if any, was too contingent or indefinite to be considered a part of 
the taxpayer's depreciable basis in the property, because the 
balance due on the mortgage could be one of three different 
11 The Court observed: 
We are rather concerned with the reality that an owner of property, mortgaged 
at a figure less than that at which the property will sell, must and will treat the 
conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations. H he 
transfers subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial as 
if the mortgage were discharged or as if a personal debt in an equal amount had 
been assumed by another. 
Id. at 14 (footnote omitted). 
11 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq., 1969-1 C.B. 21. 
•• Id. at 350. Furthermore, the Commissioner, in disallowing the depreciation deduc-
tions, clainied that the transaction was in fact a lease, and thus not a purchase. Accord-
ingly, the Commissioner classified the downpayment as the cost of obtaining a lease with 
an option to purchase, with such cost to be amortized over the ninety-nine year term. 
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amounts depending upon when payment occurred. 
The Tax Court held that a valid debt obligation was created 
by the purchase-money mortgage, despite the ninety-nine year 
term of the loan and the absence of personal obligation for re-
payment of the principal. 19 The court found the lack of personal 
liability in a nonrecourse debt not to be significant, given the 
common business practice to limit liability to the property in-
volved. so Recognizing that the parties agreed at the time of sale 
upon a conversion as soon as practicable to institutional mort-
gage financing, the court concluded that the transaction was in 
fact a bona fide arm's length purchase. Furthermore, the court 
found the variable purchase price not to constitute a contingent 
or indefinite obligation11 because the alternative prices were 
fixed in amount, merely representing an incentive for early re-
payment. That the purchaser and seller later settled the debt for 
an amount far less than the face amount was held not to affect 
•• The Court recognized that "[i]t is well accepted ... that depreciation is not predi-
cated upon ownership of property, but rather upon an investment in property." Id. This 
rule had been established earlier by two cases holding that a purchaser must make a 
capital investment in the property to acquire a depreciable interest. Bare legal title, 
without beneficial ownership, is not sufficient to support a depreciation deduction. See 
Weiss v. Weiner, 279 U.S. 333 (1929); In re Gladding Dry Goods Co., 2 B.T.A. 336 
(1925). The basis for this requirement, expressed in Blake v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 721 
(1953), is that the benefit of the depreciation deduction should inure to one who suffers 
an economic loss as a result of wear and exhaustion of the business property. 
•• 47 T.C. at 351-52. 
11 Id. at 353-54. Various Tax Court decisions have established that the cost of prop-
erty for purposes of determining its depreciable basis does not include any amount with 
respect to obligations which are contingent and indefinite in nature. See Columbus & G. 
Ry. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 834 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 358 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 827 (1966); Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831 °(1963), 
aff'd per curiam, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964); Redford v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 773, 
appeal dismissed per stipulation, (4th Cir. Nov. 27, 1957). The court in Mayerson dis-
tinguished these cases on the ground that the underlying obligation in each of the other 
cases was by its terms contingent, so that there was no amount of fixed indebtedness for 
which the purchaser was liable. For example, in Redford, the face value of a note was 
excluded from the purchaser's basis because the note was payable only from profits and 
it was uncertain whether there would ever be profits. In Albany Car Wheel, the disal-
lowed liability consisted of the purchaser's obligation to pay severance pay to its employ-
ees, where it was unknown at the time of the sale whether it would be necessary to 
satisfy any severance pay obligations. In Columbus & Greenville Railway, a mortgage 
was excluded from the taxpayer's basis where the taxpayer had by agreement been re-
lieved of all liability under the mortgage and release and satisfaction of the mortgage had 
been issued by the mortgagee prior to the time taxpayer claimed inclusion of the mort-
gage in his depreciable basis. The court in Mayerson held these three cases inapplicable 
to the purchase-money mortgage situation where a variable purchase price based on op-
tional discounts for early retirement of the mortgage is specified in dollar amounts. The 
court further held that the amount to be included in the purchaser's basis in this situa-
tion is the undiscounted amount, with a later adjustment of the basis of prepayment to 
be made under the terms of mortgage. 
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the allowable depreciation deduction in the years prior to 
settlement. 
3. Applying Crane and Mayerson to the WA mortgage pur-
chaser- The Crane and Mayerson decisions allow the WA 
mortgage purchaser to include the full amount of the WA mort-
gage in his depreciable basis. These cases afford the purchaser 
this treatment regardless of whether: (1) the WA mortgage is re-
course or nonrecourse; or (2) the purchase price under the WA 
mortgage is fixed or varies with the time of repayment. The 
transaction between the parties must be at arm's length, how-
ever, and must evidence a valid purchase and a valid debt~ 11 
In Bolger v. Commissioner,28 the Tax Court, faced with an ex-
treme set of facts, again upheld the inclusion of a nonrecourse 
purchase money obligation in the purchaser's depreciable basis. 
Ten separate transactions entered into by Bolger were chal-
lenged by the Commissioner. For each transaction Bolger had 
formed a corporation in which he was a shareholder. Each corpo-
ration negotiated to· purchase real property under an agreement 
whereby the owner and user of the property conveyed title to 
the corporation, leasing back the property. The corporation then 
sold negotiable interest-bearing notes to an institutional lender, 
in face amounts equal to the purchase price,2" and used the 
funds to purchase the property from the seller-lessee. To secure 
its obligation under the notes, the corporation executed a first 
mortgage on the property in favor of the lender and, in addition, 
assigned the lease to the lender. 
After execution of the lease and mortgage agreements, the cor-
poration conveyed each property to its shareholders for a token 
payment. As required by the mortgage agreement, the share-
holders agreed to perform all obligations under the lease and 
mortgage agreements without, however, assuming personal lia-
bility, so that the corporation remained primarily liable. Bolger, 
as a shareholder-transferee, claimed his proportionate share of 
all income and deductions attributable to the properties trans-
ferred by the corporation. The primary issues before the court 
were whether Bolger, as a shareholder-transferee, acquired a de-
11 The Service acquiesced to the Tax Court's determination in Mayerson, but also 
stated in Revenue Ruling 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59, that the acquiescence was 
based on the particular facts in the case and will not be relied upon in the dispo-
sition of other cases except in situations where it is clear that the property baa 
been acquired at its fair market value in an arm's length transaction creating a 
bona fide purchase and a bona fide debt obligation. 
u 59 T.C. 760 (1973), acq., 1976-1 C.B. 1. 
14 The notes provided for full payment over a period equal to or less than the term of 
the lease. 
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preciable interest in the properties, and if so, whether the un-
paid mortgages formed part of his depreciable basis. 
The Commissioner contended that, in each transaction, Bolger 
acquired a mere reversionary interest in the properties insuffi-
cient to support a depreciation deduction. The court, however; 
found that the corporations acquired full legal and beneficial 
title to the properties at the outset, which they transferred to 
Bolger as a shareholder, with Bolger thereby acquiring a depre-
ciable interest in the property.11 The Commissioner argued al-
ternatively that even if petitioner were the legal and beneficial 
owner of the properties, the fact that Bolger had assumed no 
personal liability under the mortgages precluded him from ad-
ding to his adjusted basis the amount of the nonrecourse debt 
encumbering the property. Because the actual cash flow was 
minimal and the properties were mortgaged to their fair market 
value, the Commissioner argued that Bolger had no reason to 
protect his property interests by making payments on the 
mortgages. 
The court disagreed, citing Crane v. Commissioner, H Black-
stone Theatre Co. v. Commissioner" and Mayerson v. Commis-
•• In determining whether a depreciable interest in the properties was acquired, the 
court first examined the corporations to ascertain whether they constituted separate, 
viable entities. Relying on the test set forth in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
319 U.S. 436 (1943), the court held that the corporations were formed to avoid state-law 
ceiling restrictions on loans to individuals and to limit personal liability of the share-
holders, both valid business purposes under Moline Properties, so that the corporations 
were valid and separate entities. 59 T.C. at 767. 
Having found that the corporations must be treated as separate entities from the 
transferee-shareholders, the court proceeded to examine the nature of the interests ac-
quired by the corporations and the shareholders. Bolger argued that in each transaction 
he acquired from the corporation both legal title to, and full beneficial ownership of, the 
property. The Commissioner claimed that - due to the execution and assignment of the 
long term lease and the provision for payments directly from the lessee to the mortgagee 
- Bolger had acquired a mere reversionary interest in the property, upon which depreci-
ation is not allowed. The court, however, found that the execution of the mortgages and 
the assignments of the leases to the mortgagees were for security purposes only. The 
assignments did not shift the responsibility away from the corporations for recognizing 
income from the rents, and accordingly did not rob the corporations of legal or beneficial 
ownership of the properties. Id. at 767-69. 
•• 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
17 12 T.C. 801 (1949), acq., 1949-2 C.B. 1. The taxpayer in Blackstone purchased a 
building for approximately $37,000 cash, subject to outstanding tax liens of approxi-
mately $120,000 against the property for assessed and unpaid real estate taxes and pen-
alties. Five years after purchase of the building, the taxpayer purchased the tax liens for 
approximately $50,000 at a public sale in connection with foreclosure of the liens. Begin-
ning with its initial acquisition of the property, the taxpayer included the entire $120,000 
of tax liens in its basis for depreciation. The Commisssioner contended that the tax-
payer's basis should include only the $50,000 for which the taxpayer later purchased the 
liens, plus certain legal and title fees incurred by the taxpayer in acquiring the lien. The 
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sioner,28 holding that Bolger did have incentive to satisfy the 
nonrecourse liabilities. Each lease payment amortizing the mort-
gages increased Bolger's equity interest in the properties, both 
for ultimate sale and potential refinancing purposes. Further, 
the Court noted that Bolger could hope to benefit from appreci-
ation in market value of the properties only by protecting his 
interest. The court reached this result even though only a very 
small cash investment had been made, the property was mort-
gaged to its full value, and the rent payments from the leases 
were included in petitioner's income although the rents were as-
signed to the institutional lender. 
B. Limitations on Inclusion of Mortgages in the Depreciable 
Basis 
The preceeding discussion has demonstrated the general rule 
that purchase-money mortgages, including WA mortgages, are 
included in the buyer's depreciable basis. This rule, however, is 
not without limitations. Examination of the relevant case law in-
dicates that exceptions to this rule exist where (1) the mortgage 
exceeds the fair market value of the property, (2) the seller re-
tains significant control over the property transferred, or (3) the 
mortgage exceeds the useful life of the encumbered property. 
1. The fair market value limitation- The court in Bolger 
made an express finding that, when the corporations transferred 
property to Bolger, the fair market value of each property equal-
led at least the remaining principal balance of the unassumed 
mortgage. In subsequent cases and rulings, this finding has be-
come essential to inclusion of the nonrecourse mortgage in a 
purchaser's basis. 29 
For instance, in Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 80 the 
court took the sensible approach that the purchaser's failure to 
demonstrate that the purchase price of real property equalled at 
court, citing Crane, held that the depreciable basis for the property included the full 
amount of the tax liens on the property at the time of purchase, even though the tax-
payer was not personally liable on the liens and subsequently was able to purchase the 
liens for a lesser amount. The court held that the depreciable basis is to be determined 
upon conditions existing when the return is filed, and that to require retroactive adjust-
ments to basis for subsequent events would result in administrative burdens which the 
Crane decision meant to avoid. 
18 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq., 1969-1 C.B. 21. 
" Rev. Rul. 69-77 states: "It is to be noted that the fair market value of the property 
was not put in issue in [Mayerson]." 1969-1 C.B. 59. Fair market value was not an issue 
in Crane either. 331 U.S. at 3. 
ao 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'g, 64 T.C. 752 (1975). 
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least approximately its fair market value was fatal to his at-
tempt to include the mortgage in his depreciable basis. The tax-
payer, a partner in a limited partnership, claimed his distribu-
tive share of depreciation and interest deductions with respect 
to a motel and related property purchased by the partnership. 81 
The purchaser's obligation was nonrecourse. The sale was com-
bined with a lease-back of the property to the sellers, with lease 
payments approximating closely the ten-year monthly payments, 
so that, except for the original prepaid interest payment, no cash 
would change hands between the sellers and the purchaser until 
a lump sum balloon payment ten years later. Because a net lease 
was involved, the sellers continued to be responsible for taxes, 
assessments, rents, utility costs, and all other charges against the 
property. In addition, the sellers were obligated for payments 
under the first and second mortgages until the balloon payment 
was made, and had the right to encumber further the property 
without the purchaser's consent. · 
The Tax Court held the transaction to be an option rather 
than a sale, and thus disallowed depreciation and interest de-
ductions based upon inclusion of the mortgage in the taxpayer's 
basis in the property. The Tax Court relied on several factors in 
reaching its decision: (1) the debt was nonrecourse, enabling the 
partnership to walk away after ten years but lose only its 
$75,000 prepaid interest; (2) the deed was not recorded; (3) the 
benefits and burdens of ownership remained with the sellers 
throughout this period; and (4) the lease payments equalled the 
purchase-money mortgage payments.82 
The Court of Appeals, although upholding the Tax Court, 
based its decision on entirely different grounds. Citing several 
cases, including Mayerson, the court stated that all indicia relied 
upon by the Tax Court to characterize the transaction as an op-
tion rather than sale could exist as well in a valid sale. The 
Court of Appeals found the fatal flaw in the transaction to be 
the lack of proof that the purchase price at least approximated 
the fair market value of the property.88 
"' The purchase price for the properties was $1,224,000. The terms of the purchase 
agreement provided for an initial payment of $75,000 of prepaid interest, monthly pay-
ments of approximately $9,000 for ten years, and a balloon payment of $975,000 at the 
end of the ten year term . 
.. 64 T.C. at 763-69. 
aa Comparing Franklin to prior cases allowing a deduction, the court stated: 
In none of these cases, however, did the taxpayer fail to demonstrate that the 
purchase price was at least approximately equivalent to the fair market value of 
the property. Just such a failure occurred here. The Tax Court explicitly found 
that on the basis of the facts before it the value of the property could not be 
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The court reasoned that when the purchase price exceeds a 
reasonable estimate of the fair market value of the property, 
payments on the purchase price do not yield any equity to the 
purchaser - therefore the purchaser makes no investment in 
the property. Following the reasoning of Crane and Mayerson, 
the court held that because depreciation is based upon an in-
vestment in property, absent personal liability a valid debt ex-
ists only where it is economically reasonable for the purchaser, 
from the date of purchase, to have an interest in making a capi-
tal investment in the amount of the unpaid purchase price. 
When the purchase price equals the fair market value of the 
property, the property owner reasonably can be expected to sat-
isfy the debt to protect his equity interest, but when the 
purchase price exceeds the estimated fair market value of the 
property, a purchaser forfeits no equity interest in the property 
by abandoning his obligation. In the latter situation, it cannot 
be assumed that the purchaser ultimately will make a capital 
investment in the property in the absence of personal liability; 
such an assumption would include necessarily a parallel assump-
tion of significant appreciation in value of the property prior to 
the investment. Thus, the court concluded that the purchaser 
should not be allowed to include the amount of any nonrecourse 
mortgage on the property in his depreciable basis when the 
purchase price exceeds the fair market value of the property." 
Under Franklin, an attempt to inflate the purchase price be-
yond the value of the property in a WA-mortgage transaction 
should be sufficient to deny the purchaser the benefits of a 
higher depreciable basis in the property. It might be argued that 
if, in a WA-financing transaction, the combined face amounts of 
the seller's senior mortgage and the purchaser's WA mortgage 
exceed the fair market value of the property, the transaction 
runs afoul of the rules established in Franklin. The Franklin de-
cision, however, rests upon the premise that a purchaser is not 
likely to satisfy a nonrecourse debt exceeding the fair market 
value of property, because such payments do not increase his 
equity in the property. In the WA situation, though, the pur-
chaser's payments on the WA mortgage do create an incentive to 
repay by increasing his equity in the property, thereby avoiding 
estimated. . . . In our view this defect in the taxpayers' proof is fatal. 
544 F.2d at 1048 . 
.. In its decision, the court in Franklin makes reference to Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 
C.B. 59, and states that "(e]mphasis on the fair market value of the property in relation 
to the apparent purchase price animates the spirit, if not the letter, of [that ruling]." 544 
F.2d at 1049 n.6. 
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the situation contemplated by Franklin. Only if the WA pur-
chaser has a purchase price exceeding the fair market value of 
the property should the liability be considered "contingent." 
Two subsequent rulings, citing Crane and Franklin, disal-
lowed inclusion of an obligation in the basis of the property for 
depreciation purposes because the purchaser failed to show that 
the value of the property approximated the value of the obliga-
tion. 311 Neither ruling qualified the magnitude of the disparity 
between purchase price and fair market value necessary to pre-
clude inclusion of the subject property in the depreciable basis. 
Franklin indicates, however, that the rule applies only to cases 
in which the purchase price substantially exceeds the fair mar-
ket value of the property.86 
2. Allocation of the benefits and burdens of ownership- The 
appellate court in Franklin based its decision solely on the dis-
parity between the purchase price and fair market value of the 
property, declining to rely upon the characteristics of the trans-
action emphasized by the Tax Court. A recent Supreme Court 
decision, Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S.,87 however, indicates that 
"' Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58. In these rulings 
the taxpayer purchased property (film rights in the earlier ruling; patent rights in the 
later ruling) for a minimal downpayment and a nonrecourse note for the balance of the 
purchase price. In both, the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that the fair market value of 
the property at least approximately equaled the amount of the nonrecourse notes. In 
each situation the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) "disallowed inclusion of the value of 
the note in the purchaser's basis in the property. In a more extreme example of the 
taxpayer's burden of proof in this area, Rev. Rul. 80-42, 1980-1 C.B. 182, the IRS limited 
the taxpayer's basis to a lower fair market value even though the actual cash paid by the 
taxpayer exceeded that amount. This Revenue Ruling indicates that in the Service's 
view, the taxpayer bears a heavy burden in this area to prove the fair market valu~ of the 
property. 
" See 544 F.2d at 1048 n.4, referring to strong evidence in the Tax Court findings 
indicating a substantial disparity between the fair market value and the purchase price 
in this case. In addition, the last paragraph of the decision expressly limits the holding 
"to transactions substantially similar to that now before us." Id. at 1049. 
•• 435 U.S. 561 (1978). In this sale-leaseback case, Lyon purchased a building under 
construction from a bank which had planned the construction to be its new offices, which 
it had hoped originally to finance and own. Due to federal regulations, the bank was 
unable to carry out its plans. The purchase price for the building was $7,640,000, with an 
initial investment by Lyon of $500,000, and a 25-year mortgage for the balance of the 
purchase price. As part of the same transaction, Lyon leased the building back to the 
bank for a 25-year term, with the rental payments under the lease equal to the payments 
due by Lyon under the mortgage. The bank retained an option to purchase the building 
after 15 years. The Commissioner attempted to reclassify the transaction as one in which 
Lyon loaned the bank the initial $500,000 investment, and acted as a mere conduit for 
the payments from the bank to the mortgagee, in order to deny Lyon depreciation de-
ductions on the property. 
The Court examined the economic realities of the transaction and noted that in situa-
tions of this type, the tax results will depend upon which party bears the economic bene-
fits and burdens associated with the ownership of property. Finding that Lyon alone was 
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courts may focus upon the allocation of the "benefits and bur-
dens of ownership" in highly leveraged transactions. Like the 
Tax Court's analysis in Franklin, this analytical focus may disal-
low depreciation deductions based on nonrecourse debt when 
the sellers retain the indicia of ownership. 
The allocation of benefits and burdens among the parties to a 
WA mortgage therefore might influence the purchaser's ability 
to inflate his basis in the property. In a WA-financing transac-
tion, the parties often employ a land sale contract which delays 
title passage until the entire purchase price has been satisfied, 
with the WA mortgagee remaining liable as mortgagor on the 
initial mortgage(s). Because the land sale contract merely 
postpones passage of legal title to the property in order to pro-
tect the seller against the purchaser's default on the contract, 
however, such a purchaser acquires all the usual indicia of own-
ership throughout the term of the WA mortgage. The seller's ob-
ligation on the original mortgage neither diminishes the pur-
chaser's liability on the WA mortgage nor shifts the benefits and 
burdens of ownership with respect to the WA-financing transac-
tion. These aspects of the WA-financing transaction thus should 
not deny the purchaser his cost basis under a benefits-and-bur-
dens analysis. 
3. The useful life limitation- A 1971 Tax Court memoran-
dum decision, Marcus v. Commissioner, 38 placed another restric-
tion upon the purchaser's ability to include nonrecourse indebt-
edness in his cost basis. Marcus involved myriad transactions in 
which the taxpayer acquired bowling alleys, lanes, and pinsetters 
for amounts greatly in excess of the original asking price. In 
each transaction the taxpayer made a small downpayment and 
executed a non-interest-bearing note for the balance of the 
purchase price. The term of the note in each transaction sub-
stantially exceeded the useful life of the property. In all but two 
transactions the notes were nonrecourse. 
The court noted that the contract price in each transaction 
bore no relationship to the fair market value of the properties. 
In denying inclusion of the mortgage in the taxpayer's basis, 
however, the court relied upon the fact that each mortgage term 
greatly exceeded the useful life of the property. The Court rea-
soned that the purchaser is not likely to continue to make pay-
obligated for payments on the notes, and that it had disclosed this liability on its balance 
sheets, thereby decreasing its ability to obtain financing for other needs, the Court held 
that Lyon had a capital investment in the property for which it was entitled to claim 
depreciation. 
sa 30 T.C.M. 1263 (1971), atf'd, (3d Cir. Apr. 8, 1974). 
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ment on a nonrecourse obligation after the useful life of the 
property has expired. 89 
In Marcus, the court made no reference to its earlier decision 
in Mayerson, which upheld the validity of a ninety-nine year 
purchase-money mortgage on property with a useful life of 
twenty-five years.'0 The court in Mayerson found a valid debt 
despite its lengthy term because "a definite contractual obliga-
tion was created which would have had to be fulfilled by or 
before a definite date in the future."0 Although the note in 
Mayerson was a nonrecourse obligation, the court did not ana-
lyze the result to the taxpayer if he failed to fulfill his obliga-
tions under the note after the property no longer had a useful 
life. This failure to examine the economic reality of such a situa-
tion seems contrary to the court's holding that nonrecourse debt 
should be included in a purchaser's basis.'1 Under the likelihood 
of repayment analysis, espoused by Franklin and adopted in 
Marcus, a nonrecourse purchase-money obligation with a term 
exceeding substantially the property's useful life poses the same 
problems as a nonrecourse obligation in excess of the fair market 
value of the property - because the purchaser can walk away 
from the property at some point during the term, without loss of 
investment or further liability, it is not reasonable to expect that 
the purchaser will pay the full contract price. Accordingly, the 
Marcus decision is correct; notwithstanding Mayerson, a mort-
gage should not be included in the buyer's basis to the extent 
that it exceeds the useful life of the encumbered property. 
A purchaser commonly will claim a shorter useful life for de-
preciation than the term of the bank mortgage on the property. 
In states where nonrecourse financing is the primary vehicle for 
the financing of real property,.a the Marcus reasoning might 
.. 30 T.C.M. at 1273. 
•• "Although this term does seem unusually long, after viewing the totality of the cir-
cumstances and all the evidence of record we have found and hold that a valid debt 
obligation was created by the purchase money mortgage in question." Mayerson v. Com-
missioner, 47 T.C. 340, 352 (1966), acq., 1969-1 C.B. 21. 
" Id. at 352. 
•• The court's failure to examine this issue in greater depth may have been due to the 
particular facts surrounding the purchase transaction. Although the stated term of the 
note was 99 years, the court noted several times that the 99-year term was never ex-
pected to run its course, because the parties had agreed Mayerson would get commercial 
financing as soon as possible. In addition, Mayerson did obtain conventional financing, 
retiring the 99-year mortgage six years after the purchase. Thus, the court may have 
been reluctant to bar inclusion of the debt in Mayerson's depreciable basis solely by 
reason of its 99-year term. 
•• For example, in California, purchase money debt for real estate is nonrecourse. See 
Braun v. Crew, 183 Cal. 728, 192 P. 531 (1920). 
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pose a threat to inclusion of the mortgage in the purchaser's de-
preciable basis where he claims a shorter useful life than the 
term of the bank loan. Closer examination, however, demon-
strates that Marcus does not necessarily preclude inclusion of 
the mortgage in the depreciable basis where the bank loan's 
term exceeds the stipulated useful life. 
The appropriate measure for calculating useful life on the tax-
payer's property is the length of time during which it is econom-
ically profitable for him to use that asset in his particular busi-
ness.•• Thus, "taxable useful life" of a property may differ from 
the "economic useful life" of that property, which continues un-
til the property is of no value regardless of its use or of the tax-
payer involved. For example, assume the taxpayer purchases a 
building to be used as a manufacturing plant. After ten years, he 
might be forced to sell the building because expansion of the 
company and changes in technology require replacement of the 
building with a larger, more modern facility. Although, for that 
taxpayer, the appropriate useful tax life of the building is ten 
years, its economic useful life will be longer if the building re-
mains of value to someone. O~ly when the building becomes 
worthless for all purposes does its economic useful life end. 
To analyze inclusion of a nonrecourse obligation in a tax-
payer's cost basis for depreciation, the economic useful life 
should govern. Only when an asset has no economic value to the 
taxpayer - so that the taxpayer can neither make productive 
use of the property nor realize a return on a sale of the property 
- does the likelihood of repayment diminish, creating a contin-
gent liability. Accordingly, under the Marcus rationale, a nonre-
course liability should be excluded from a taxpayer's depreciable 
basis only when the term of liability exceeds the economic useful 
life of the encumbered property. A taxpayer claiming a tax use-
ful life shorter than the mortgage term is not being inconsistent, 
and should not be threatened by the reasoning of Marcus, at 
least where the term of the loan does not exceed the economic 
useful life of the property. 
C. Standards for Inclusion of the WA Mortgage in the 
Purchaser's Depreciable Basis 
As Crane and Mayerson illustrate, the recourse or nonre-
course nature of a debt is not dispositive of whether that debt 
" See Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S. 122 (1960); Massey Motors, Inc. v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960). 
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may be included in the purchaser's depreciable basis. The Crane 
and Mayerson test, measuring the contingency of an obligation 
by the economic incentive to repay, should be the primary con-
sideration in analyzing WA mortgages with a substantial 
purchase-money nonrecourse debt. 
Applicable case law provides guidance for inclusion of wrap-
arounds in the purchaser's depreciable basis. Bolger, Franklin, 
and Marcus define the bounds within which a WA-financing 
transaction may be structured to permit inclusion of the WA 
mortgage in the purchaser's depreciable basis. Bolger and 
Franklin demonstrate that the parties to the transaction have 
flexibility in negotiating the financing terms of the WA mort-
gage, in allocating the burdens and benefits of ownership, and in 
limiting the purchaser's liability on the WA mortgage. Franklin 
correctly indicates, however, that failure to prove that the con-
tract price does not exceed the property's fair market value 
should result in exclusion of nonrecourse debt from the pur-
chaser's basis. Similarly, as indicated in Marcus, nonrecourse 
debt with a term in excess of the property's economic useful life 
should be excluded from the purchaser's basis. 
Use of a land sales contract in a WA-financing transaction 
does not, per se, affect the purchaser's inclusion of the WA 
mortgage in his depreciable basis. Although legal title does not 
pass to the purchaser until the debt has been satisfied, the land 
sale contract purchaser shoulders the economic benefits and bur-
dens of ownership. Thus, an examination of the "economic reali-
ties" of the transaction under Lyon would reveal a depreciable 
interest in the purchaser. 
The fact that the combined face amounts of the purchaser's 
WA mortgage and the seller's senior mortgage exceed the fair 
market value of the property is not relevant in determining 
whether the WA mortgage should be included in the purchaser's 
basis, so long as the stated purchase price does not substantially 
exceed the fair market value of the property. If the purchase 
price is not in excess of the fair market value, and the payment 
period does not exceed the economic useful life of the property, 
the purchaser's payments on the WA mortgage increase his eq-
uity in the property, providing the purchaser with the necessary 
incentive to repay the mortgage. 
II. DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES 
Due-on-sale clauses, and the closely related due-on-encum-
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brance clauses, arose as a response of lending institutions to ris-
ing interest rates during the past two decades.411 Buyers found it 
financially advantageous to assume the seller's lower fixed-rate-
interest loan, particularly when interest rate differentials be-
tween currently available loans and older loans often ranged 
above five percent and conventional financing was sometimes 
unavailable at any reasonable price. Lending institutions corre-
spondingly found it disadvantageous to permit such assump-
tions, and began utilizing due-on-sale and due-on-encumbrance 
clauses to escalate interest rates on loans otherwise assumable at 
lower rates. Some lenders justified use of such clauses on the 
ground that their security interests were impaired upon sale or 
further encumbrance of the property. 
The availability of WA mortgages as an alternate financing 
method may, depending upon the jurisdiction in which the 
transaction occurs, be barred if a due-on-sale clause is contained 
within the seller's original mortgage. If due-on clauses were au-
tomatically enforced, they would eliminate the very cornerstone 
of purchase-money WA financing - preservation of the first 
mortgage at a favorable interest rate. Accordingly, any party 
contemplating a WA-financed sale must determine whether a 
due-on-sale clause is present, and if so, to what extent it is en-
forceable. Loans older than ten years and loans insured by the · 
Veteran's Administration may not contain one of these clauses.48 
Even if a due.:.on clause is present, however, all may not be lost 
- many jurisdictions do not automatically enforce such clauses, 
•• A typical due-on clause is the following: 
Should Trustor sell, convey, transfer, dispose of or further encumber said prop-
erty, or any part thereof, or any interest therein, or agree to do so, without the 
written consent of Beneficiary first being first obtained, then Beneficiary shall 
have the right, at its option, to declare all sums secured hereby forthwith due 
and payable. 
See Comment, Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Case for Adopting 
Standards of Reasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1109, 1110 n.5 
(1975). Not all due-on clauses are as broad as this one, which appears literally to permit 
the lender to accelerate the mortgage debt if the borrower rents his home for the sum• 
mer. For example, regulations issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) 
in 1976 governing federally chartered savings and loan institutions prohibit the exercise 
of a due-on clause simply because a second lien has been created or a leasehold interest 
of less than three years has been granted. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(0, (g) (1980); First 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. App. 1980) (interpreting and 
discll88ing the FHLBB regulations). However, the FHLBB regulations permit, and most 
due-on-sale clauses allow, the mortgagee to accelerate the mortgage debt if the mort-
gagor "sells the secured real estate." 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(0 (1980). Moreover, the lan-
guage of the due-on clause usually is broad enough to encompass installment sales where 
the seller retains title. 
" See 38 C.F.R. § 36.4308(a) (1980). 
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primarily because they may constitute an unreasonable restraint 
upon alienation;n Because no court has confronted the issue of 
enforceability of due-on-sale clauses in WA-financed sales, one 
must proceed by analyzing case law involving first mortgage as-
sumptions and creation of junior encumbrances. Some addi-
tional insight may be provided by drawing analogies between 
WA sales and cases involving installment land contracts, as 
many WA transactions utilize installment land contracts in lieu 
of deeds of trust. 
A. The Common Law Approach to Due-on-Sale Clauses 
The threshold question regarding the enforceability of a due-
on-sale clause is whether such a clause would constitute an un-
reasonable restraint on alienation. A prohibition against such re-
straints exists in all states, either through case law or statute. 48 
1. The California experience- Examination of the California 
experience with due-on clauses necessarily must provide the 
starting point for analysis of this threshold question, for other 
jurisdictions essentially have adopted either end of California's 
evolving law in this area. Early California cases held that due-
on-sale clauses were a reasonable restraint on alienation and 
therefore would be upheld."9 By 1979, the California Supreme 
Court had swung full circle, finding such a clause to be generally 
unreasonable, justifiable only where the lender could show an 
impairment of its security. 
The· California Supreme Court first addressed this issue in 
Coast Bank u. Minderhout, &o a 1964 case dealing with an un-
usual instrument held to constitute an equitable mortgage under 
California law. The seller-mortgagor had agreed in the instru-
ment not to transfer or encumber the property without the 
lender's consent, until the loan was paid, but transferred the 
property in violation of the agreement. The court acknowledged 
., See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1979); Meyers 
v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974); Williams v. 
Speedster, Inc., 175 Colo. 73, 485 P.2d 728 (1971). 
•• See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1974), providing that "conditions restraining 
alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void." 
•• See Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, .38 Cal. Rptr. 505 
(1964), overruled, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 
Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978); Cherry v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 135 (1969), disapproved in Wellenkamp; Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 
Cai. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974). 
00 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), overruled, Wellenkamp v. 
Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). 
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the permissibility of some restraints on alienation - noting that 
only unreasonable restraints on alienation were prohibited. The 
court proceeded to find reasonable a lender's conditioning the 
extension of credit on the mortgagor's retention of ownership of 
the property, holding that acceleration of the loan by the lender 
if the mortgagor should default was both reasonable and valid.'11 
In a subsequent California Court of Appeals decision, Cherry 
v. Home Savings & Loan Association, H the plaintiff attempted 
to avoid a due-on-sale acceleration by arguing that there was an 
important conditi<Dt in the mortgage agreement that the lender 
would not withhold its consent to any transfer of the property 
unless it could show impairment of its security.118 The court re-
jected this argument, finding that the lender merely was exercis-
ing its rights under the mortgage agreement. Because the due-
on-sale clause was justified by business considerations, allowing 
the lender to take advantage of rising interest rates, the lender 
was not required to show impairment of its security as a condi-
tion precedent to enforcement of the clause." 
By 1969, therefore, the law was "settled" in California that 
due-on-sale clauses were not unreasonable restraints on aliena-
tion and would be enforced automatically, even if the lender's 
security were not impaired. Over the next ten years, however,· 
the California courts slowly modified their view as to what con-
stituted a reasonable restraint on alienation, gradually eroding 
and finally overruling Coast Bank. 
The first step in this erosion occurred in La Sala v. American 
Savings & Loan Association, 115 where the California Supreme 
Court denied enforcement of a due-on-encumbrance clause. The 
court drew an important distinction between the enforceability 
of due-on-sale and due-on-encumbrance clauses. A due-on-sale 
clause does not preclude the seller-mortgagor from selling the 
property and paying off the first lien, but rather merely prohib-
its the seller-mortgagor from transferring the property with the 
transferee assuming the mortgage. In contrast, a due-on-encum-
•
1 The court stated in dictum that a direct prohibition against selling the house would 
have been invalid. A due-on-sale clause, however, was only an indirect restraint. 61 Cal. 
2d at 314, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508. 
" 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969), disapproved in Wellenkamp v. Bank 
of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978); Tucker v. Lassen 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974). 
" The due-on-sale clause in Cherry, as do most such clauses, held that the loan would 
be accelerated if the mortgagor transferred the property without the mortgagee's 
consent. 
04 81 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38. 
00 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971). 
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brance clause effectively precludes all refinancing, for a junior 
encumbrance rarely will produce funds sufficient to pay off the 
first lien. This led the court to find the due-on-encumbrance 
clause at issue to be an unreasonable restraint on alienation, en-
forceable only if the lender were able to show an impairment of 
its security. 
In balancing the possible impairment to the lender's security 
against the degree of restraint upon alienation which the due-
on-encumbrance clause created, the court concluded that en-
forcement of the due-on-encUlilbrance clause was not necessary 
to protect the lender's security interest.116 The extent of the bor-
rower's remaining interest was the crucial issue to the La Sala 
court. Because the borrower retained sufficient economic incen-
tive to prevent waste or deterioration, no justification existed for 
accelerating the note. The court rejected the lender's argument 
that maintaining a portfolio of loans at current interest rates 
was a valid justification for enforcing the clause. After noting 
that due-on-encumbrance clauses are more restrictive than due-
on-sale clauses, the court stated that a restraint on alienation is 
not reasonable merely by virtue of its profitability to the 
restrainor .117 
The next step in Coast Bank's demise came three years later, 
in Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Association, H when the 
California Supreme Court refused to enforce a due-on-sale 
clause in an installment land contract sale. The court held that 
Tucker's entering into an executory contract to sell land did not 
justify automatic enforcement of the due-on-sale clause, because 
the lender's security interest was not significantly impaired. 
After first defining outright sales as all transactions "wherein 
the seller receives full payment from and transfers legal title to 
the buyer,"&e the court observed that installment sales differ 
from outright sales in that an installment sale vendor rarely re-
ceives a cash down payment sufficient to satisfy the balance due 
on the note. Additionally, the court observed that the install-
ment sale vendor retains legal title, so that his interest in main-
taining the property and preventing waste is greater than that of 
an outright seller. 
06 5 Cal. 3d at 880 n.17, 489 P.2d at 1123 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859 n.17. This view was 
subsequently codified by the California legislature in a provision prohibiting acceleration 
of a due-on clause because of a junior encumbrance. CAL. Ctv. CODE§ 2949 (West 1974). 
See also VA. CODE § 6.1-2.5 (1975). 
07 5 Cal. 3d at 880 n.17, 489 P.2d at 1123 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859 n.17. 
•• 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974). 
•• Id. at 634 n.6, 526 P.2d at 1172 n.6, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 636 n.6. 
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The Tucker court articulated a standard for enforcement of 
due-on60 clauses: "To the degree that enforcement of the [ due-
on] clause would result in an increased quantum of actual re-
straint on alienation in the particular case, a greater justification 
for such enforcement from the standpoint of the lender's legiti-
mate interests will be required in order to warrant enforce-
ment. "61 Such legitimate interests of the lender would include 
(a) preserving the security from depreciation or waste, and (b) 
guarding against the moral risks of having to resort to the secur-
ity upon default.62 The court expressly limited its holding to sit-
uations involving land sale contracts, specifically declining con-
sideration of the test's application to an outright sale situation. 
The landmark 1978 case of Wellenkamp v. Bank of America68 
rejected the distinction between outright sales and installment 
sales in non-commercial settings. Wellenkamp had paid the sell-
ers an amount equal to their equity interest in the subject prop-
80 Any subsequent discussion of due-on-sale clauses necessarily includes due-on-en-
cumbrance clauses as well. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 
970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978), establishes that both types of clauses will be evaluated by 
the same test: whether the amount of restraint upon alienation that the clause imposes 
can be justified by the lender's interest in protecting its investment. As La Sala indi-
cates, however, the lender's justification must be higher to enforce a due-on-encum-
brance clause, because such a clause imposes a higher degree of restraint on alienation. 
See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra. 
•• 12 Cal. 3d at 636, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637. The court compared 
outright sales with installment sales: 
[T]he contrast between an outright sale and an executory sale by installment 
land contract is striking. In the former . . . the automatic application of the 
"due-on" clause results in little if any restraint on alienation because the terms 
of the second sale usually provide for full payment of the prior trust deed. In 
other words, the trustor-vendor normally receives enough money through the 
financing of the second sale to pay off his note, and he is normally required to do 
so. Little if any restraint on alienation results through enforcement of the 
provision. 
In the case of the installment land contract, however, the matter is otherwise. 
The trustor-vendor normally receives a relatively small down payment upon exe-
cution of the contract, the remainder of the purchase price to be paid through 
monthly installments. This down payment, like the proceeds of the junior en-
cumbrance involved in La Sala, "does not often provide the borrower with the 
means to discharge the balance secured by the trust deed." (Citation omitted) 
The result is that a conveyance by means of an installment land contract would 
essentially be precluded in all cases wherein the balance due on the trustor-ven-
dor's note was substantial if the "due-on" clause were to be given automatic 
effect. Accordingly, although the trustor-vendor might be willing to accept a rate 
of interest lower than that currently offered by institutional lenders, the pro-
spective purchaser would be compelled to resort to such lenders to finance the 
acquisition of the property. The result in terms of restraint on alienation is clear. 
Jd. at 637-38, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638. 
•• Id. at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639. 
•• 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). 
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erty, and then assumed the balance outstanding on the sellers' 
mortgage. The California Supreme Court, in reversing the court 
of appeals, extended · to the lender in all cases the burden of 
proving that enforcement of a due-on clause was reasonably nec-
essary to prevent impairment of the security interest and to pro-
tect against default. Thus, due-on clauses no longer would be 
enforced automatically in California. Outright sales were rede-
fined as any transfer of legal title," with the court adopting the 
Tucker balancing test to determine if there had been an unrea-
sonable restraint upon alienation. 60 
The Wellenkamp court determined that the mere fact of sale 
does not constitute justification for enforcement of a due-on 
clause; rather, some substantial actual risk of impairment to the 
security interest must be shown. The court advanced three rea-
sons supporting its rejection of automatic enforcement upon the 
mere fact of sale: (1) automatic enforcement is not justified sim-
ply because there is a possibility that the purchaser may· be un-
creditworthy or wasteful; (2) in transactions in which either the 
seller or the buyer retains an equity interest in the property, 
there normally remains a sufficient incentive to prevent waste or 
default; and (3) a lender's commercial interest in maintaining its 
loan portfolio at current rates is not a justification for 
enforcement. 66 
"' Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383. 
ea One commentator has urged that the degree of restraint upon alienation, discussed 
in Tucker and Wellenkamp, should be measured by the seller's loss in equity occasioned 
by the due-on clause, rather than as suggested in Wellenkamp, the amount of loss 
caused by the seller's decision to forego the sale: 
Assume there are two homes, equally valued and equally encumbered by deeds 
of trust bearing interest at eight percent per annum. Home A, however, is sad-
dled with a due-on-sale clause while home B is not. Current rates are ten and 
three-fourths percent per annum. When both homes are put up for sale, home A 
is placed at an obvious disadvantage to home B, due entirely to the due-on-sale 
clause. Homeowner A will have to reduce the sale price to compete with home-
owner B. The resulting difference in price is the economic equivalent of the re-
straint on alienation. 
Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: A Victory for the Consumer? 31 HASTINGS L.J. 
275, 285 (1979). This proposed analysis permits a court to determine accurately the ac-
tual restraint imposed by such a clause in any particular case, absent "an unnecessary 
variable-the bonower's mental processes." Id. at 286. 
" 21 Cal. 3d at 951-53, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85. In addition, the 
·. court observed that the enactment of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.5 (West Supp. 1981), provid-
ing for utilization of variable rate mortgages, presented a viable and attractive alterna-
tive to lending institutions as a method of adjusting their loan portfolios. 21 Cal. 3d at 
952 n.10, 582 P.2d at 976 n.10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.10. One commentator observed, 
however, that the lender's interest in maintaining a current loan portfolio is not without 
merit, especially in inflationary times with increasing interest rates, because some bor-
rowers tend to look upon variable rate mortgages with disfavor. Note, supra note 65, at 
290-97. See id. at 295 (concluding thst a standard fixed rate loan containing a due-on-
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The court rejected the lender's current interest rate portfolio 
argument because, in its view, a restraint upon alienation of land 
is unreasonable when it serves solely as a hedge against inflation. 
Although the court limited its holding to institutional lenders, 
the commercial status of the lender should not be significant if 
the evil to be avoided is restraint upon alienation. 87 
California case law concerning the validity of due-on clauses 
has evolved considerably - from automatic enforcement of such 
clauses in Coast Bank and Cherry to the case-by-case reason-
ableness approach first advanced in La Sala and Tucker and 
later adopted in Wellenkamp. Other jurisdictions considering 
the validity of due-on clauses have essentially adopted either ex-
treme of the California experience - some favor automatic en-
forcement, or at least a strong presumption of validity,88 while 
sale clause is a valuable option for buyers who anticipate keeping a house for a substan-
tial length of time). 
•• A mortgagee's attempt to foreclose on a deed of trust on a service station was suc-
cessfully enjoined in Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975). The deed of trust 
required no payment of interest until maturity, but contained a due-on-sale clause. The 
buyers, who were of substantial means, agreed to take the property subject to the deed of 
trust in order to have the advantageous terms of this note. The Mississippi Supreme 
Court, in granting the injunction, stated that the restriction could not be enforced simply 
on the basis that a party of substantial means was taking unjust and inequitable advan-
tage of a contractual concession. This justification was not a threat to the legitimate 
interests of the beneficiaries. 
Sanders is significant because it involved a private lender and a commercial setting. 
Whereas the California Supreme Court in Wellenkamp had suggested that due-on-sale 
clauses in notes executed in favor of private lenders would be subject to automatic en-
forcement - absent unconscionable or inequitable conduct by the lender - the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court held that a private lender would not be accorded an easier standard 
for enforcement than an institutional lender, at least when the transaction is within a 
commercial setting. Wellenkamp, in contrast, had indicated that a private lender should 
enjoy an easier burden for justifying enforcement of a due-on-sale clause. 
The Sanders result perhaps is undesirable. Especially in an era of limited credit, pri-
vate lenders, at least in Mississippi and those jurisdictions following its lead, undoubt-
edly will think twice before loaning funds secured by real property. 
88 These jurisdictions do not scrutinize carefully actions of the parties in deciding 
whether due-on-sale clauses should be enforced. Rather, absent a clear showing of un-
conscionable or inequitable conduct on the part of the mortgagee-lender, in general the 
clause will be presumed valid and automatically enforceable. Colorado upheld enforce-
ment of a due-on clause in Malouff v. Midland Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 
509 P.2d 1240 (1973). The Colorado Supreme Court relied heavily upon Justice Tray-
nor's language in Coast Bank: "The view that the common-law rule against restraints on 
alienation prohibits all such restraints has been forcefully criticized on the ground that it 
loses sight of the purposes of the rule and needlessly invalidates reasonable restraints 
designed to protect justifiable interests of the parties." Id. at 300, 509 P.2d at 1243 
(quoting 61 Cal. 2d at 314, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508). In light of this determi-
nation that a due-on clause was not an invalid restraint per se, the court observed: 
Both parties have the benefit of their original bargain during their continued 
creditor-debtor relationship. However, when the property is sold to a purchaser 
who desires to assume the existing loan, economic consideration may reasonably 
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others prefer the case-by-case reasonableness approach of Wel-
lenkamp.69 At least one jurisdiction attempted to resolve the 
issue of enforceability by constitutional amendment.70 
2. Applying Wellenkamp to WA financing- No court has 
confronted squarely the issue of whether a due-on clause may be 
enforced when a WA-financing arrangement is present. The cur-
rent California approach, embodied by Wellenkamp, should be 
applied to WA situations, thereby limiting the enforceability of 
due-on clauses. In Wellenkamp the court stated: 
justify the lender in raising the interest rate to or approaching one equal to the 
cunent market rate. We view the condition imposed for the non-exercise of the 
acceleration clause under such circumstances to be a reasonable protection of a 
justifiable interest and the operative effect of the clause does not therefore con-
stitute an invalid restraint on alienation. 
Id. at 303, 509 P.2d at 1245. See also Century Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 
144 N.J. Super. 48, 53, 364 A.2d 558, 562 (1976) (the necessity of protecting the lender 
from rising interest rates constitutes a valid justification for enforcing due-on clauses). 
•• The Supreme Court of Arkansas adopted the case-by-case reasonableness approach 
in the lending case of Tucker v. Pulaski Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849,481 S.W.2d 725 
(1972). The mortgagor-sellers had searched over a year for prospective purchasers, finally 
finding a buyer for their apartment house. The buyers tendered a $1,500 cash down pay-
ment and agreed to take subject to the mortgage in favor of Pulaski. Pursuant to the 
due-on-sale clause in the mortgage, Pulaski accelerated the note and brought a foreclo-
sure action. The Arkansas court refused to allow the mortgagee, "simply on the basis of 
the quoted clause, [to) accelerate the note, declare the indebtedness due and payable, 
and foreclose upon the property. This procedure cannot be countenanced in a court of 
equity." Id. at 852, 481 S.W.2d at 728. The court held the burden for establishing justifi-
cation for enforcement of the clause to be on the mortgagee, and that Pulaski had failed 
to meet this burden. Finally, the court noted that the buyers had never previously de-
faulted on any real estate notes held by Pulaski, and that the mortgagor-sellers still re-
mained liable on the debt, so that the mortgagee necessarily would have to establish a 
strong justification for enforcement. 
Similarly, in Fidelity Land Development Corp. v. Rieder & Sons Bldg. and Develop-
ment Co., Inc., 151 N.J. Super. 502, 377 A.2d 691 (1977), acceleration of a note was 
rejected. The corporate mortgagor conveyed land to its principal stockholder but, upon 
realization that the mortgagee regarded the transfer as a justification for invoking the 
acceleration clause, the land was transferred back to the corporation. The New Jersey 
Superior Court held that the transfer was a mere paper change in title, and did not 
constitute a sufficient justification for accelerating the note. 
•
0 The following proposal for amending the Colorado Constitution was rejected in the 
November, 1980 general election: 
Shall Article XVIII of the Constitution of the State of Colorado be amended to 
provide that in order that all persons shall have the right to sell or transfer their 
Real Estate or any interest therein subject to existing financing, no person shall 
or lending institution with a security interest in the Real Estate shall accelerate 
or mature the indebtedness secured by such Real Estate or alter the terms and 
conditions of the indebtedness or security interest because of such sale or trans-
fer, so long as the original debtor remains directly responsible for the indebted-
ness and the security for the indebtedness is not substantially impaired by the 
sale or transfer? 
(On file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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When the seller does not receive the value of his equity 
in cash but takes back a second or "all-inclusive" deed of 
trust for a portion thereof, he of course retains an equity 
. interest in the property which provides him with an in-
centive to prevent waste or default. In this case, then, 
both the buyer and the seller have an interest in preserv-
ing the security. The lender's position thus resembles 
that occupied by it in the context of an installment land 
sale contract. 71 
427 
This favorable comparison with installment land contract sales, 
although dictum, suggests that a strong justification may have to 
be established by the lender to permit enforcement of due-on 
clauses in WA-financing arrangements, even in those jurisdic-
tions not following Wellenkamp.72 A jurisdiction that automati-
cally enforces due-on-sale clauses in outright sales situations 
may be less willing to do so in a WA transaction. Such a transac-
tion necessarily involves retention by the seller of a sufficient 
interest in the property vis-a-vis the senior mortgage, so that the 
incentive to prevent waste will undoubtedly be high. California's 
protection of Wellenkamp-type transactions (outright sales with 
assumption of the seller's mortgage) logically should encompass 
the WA situation as well - a WA arrangement assures the origi-
nal lender of adequate protection of the underlying security, be-
cause of the seller's continuing interest in the property. 
B. Proposal for Legislative Intervention 
1. Drawbacks in the •Wellenkamp and automatic enforcement 
approaches- The validity and propriety of due-on-sale clauses 
have been the subject of much litigation and debate. The state 
courts have either adopted the Wellenkamp balancing approach, 
71 21 Cal. 3d at 951 n.8, 582 P.2d at 975 n.8, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384 n.8. 
•• Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Harn, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), for instance, 
involved a mortgagee's attempt in a jurisdiction following the Wellenkamp rule, to in-
voke the due-on-sale clause following the mortgagor's execution of an agreement to sell 
the subject property. After acknowledging that an agreement to sell was a conveyance 
within the meaning of a due-on-sale clause, the court refused enforcement simply upon 
allegation that the acceleration clause terms had been violated. Instead, the court would 
require "allegation that the purpose of the clause is . . . being circumvented or that the 
mortgagee's security is jeopardized .... " Id. at 81, 486 P.2d at 193. Because the mort-
gagee had failed to allege impairment of its security interest, the court refused to enforce 
the clause. In addition, the court noted that large pre-payment penalties were involved, 
so that enforcement of the due-on-sale clause "could be unconscionably harsh." Id. 
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or allowed automatic enforcement of the clauses. 78 From the 
standpoint of sound public policy, each approach has 
difficulties. 74 
The most obvious problem with the case-by-case approach of 
Wellenkamp is its generation of litigation without outlining 
clear standards for enforcement. Wellenkamp appears to be a 
consumer-oriented decision,711 yet its benefits may prove illusory 
if lending institutions choose to litigate aggressively against 
homeowners unwilling or unable to resist. The mere threat of a 
lawsuit may restrain alienation as much as a due-on-sale clause. 
Wellenkamp also may result in increased costs of transferring 
•• However, the Illinois Supreme Court held that due-on clauses should be automati-
cally enforced in Baker v. Loves Park Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 
(1975). The court noted that "stability of real estate titles is of paramount importance, 
[so that] it is necessary that the court follow a policy in construing restraints on aliena-
tion which will produce a reasonable degree of certainty." Id. at 126, 333 N.E.2d at 5. 
The court reasoned that a greater degree of certainty was required in the case of land 
titles, thus justifying automatic enforcement of these contractual agreements absent un-
conscionable or inequitable conduct. In the absence of such conduct, the clause would be 
presumed valid and automatfcally enforceable. See, e.g., Stith v. Hudson City Sav. Inst., 
63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976); Gunther .v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 
1973); Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wisc. 2d 531, 239 
N.W.2d 20 (1976). 
The Supreme Court of Nevada extended Baker even further, in First Commercial 
Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976). The court held that a due-on 
clause is entitled to automatic enforcement whenever there has been an outright sale, by 
the trustor. Id. at 366, 550 P.2d at 1272. The court expressed no opinion as to the en-
forceability of such clauses in an installment land contract setting. In addition, the court 
explicitly rejected the reasonableness approach, refusing to impose the burden upon the 
lender-beneficiary to establish justification for enforcement of the clause. Instead, the 
Nevada court, and other courts which tend toward automatic enforcement, would "bur-
den the trustor with the responsibility of establishing grounds for unenforceability." Id. 
at 366, 550 P.2d at 1272. 
" Not all jurisdictions, however, have fallen neatly into either category. Illustrative of 
the confusion are the seemingly conflicting positions taken by the Washington Supreme 
Court in two 1976 cases. The court first upheld a due-on-sale clause in Miller v. Pacific 
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976), which specifically 
allowed an increase in the interest rate by the mortgagee upon sale of the subject prop-
erty. While qualifying approval partially upon the absence of unconscionable or inequita-
ble conduct, the court did recognize as legitimate the mortgagee's interest in being pro-
tected against rising interest rates. A few months later, the Washington Supreme Court 
seemed to adopt the case-by-case reasonableness approach, contrary to the virtually au-
tomatic enforcement approach of Miller, upholding a due-on clause in Bellingham First 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison because the mortgagee had met its burden of proof. 
87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976). See 12 GoNz. L. REv. 765 (1977). The court, after 
noting that due-on clauses were not invalid per se and then shifting the burden for justi-
fying enforcement to the mortgagee, held in favor of the mortgagee because of the mort-
gagor's questionable credit rating and delinquencies in satisfying the mortgage debt. 
•• The enforcement of due-on-sale clauses occurs most often in consumer purchases of 
personal residences. In California, for example, the average house changes hands every 
four to five years. See Comment, supra note 45, at 1111 & n.6. 
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ownership in real property, regardless of whether a lawsuit 
arises, because homeowner-sellers, lenders, and buyers may in-
cur additional legal fees in negotiating a compromise settlement 
to avoid litigation. Congress has already found real estate settle-
ment charges to be "unnecessarily high"78 in many parts of the 
country. Finally, Wellenkamp may penalize lending institutions 
subject to state law which are competing with federally 
chartered savings and loans able to enforce due-on clauses under 
FHLBB regulations. 77 
Automatic enforcement of due-on clauses also poses signifi-
cant drawbacks. Automatic enforcement, at least in times of ris-
ing interest rates, likely does restrain alienation. The crucial 
question becomes the extent of this restraint. Homeowners who 
have the luxury of choosing when, and if, to sell may opt to rent, 
thus continuing to build equity at favorable interest rates. On 
the other hand, homeowners who must sell will do so regardless 
of the existence of a due-on-sale clause. Whether, then, due-on 
clauses significantly impair the free alienability of land is debat-
able; nonetheless it seems clear that automatic enforcement 
does, to some extent, restrict alienation. 
Jurisdictions that automatically enforce due-on-sale clauses 
generally accept the lender's current interest rate portfolio argu-
ment or the lender's interest in protecting his security.78 These 
arguments, however, are invalid in this context. Analysis of due-
on clauses should not be concerned with whether the homeowner 
or lender is the proper party to benefit from the chosen judicial 
approach. In addition, courts expressing concern for the lender's 
interests have often routinely resolved issues of unconscionabil-
ity and adhesion contracts in the lender's favor. This fails to rec-
ognize the possibilities for a lender with bargaining power to 
couple a due-on-sale clause with a hefty prepayment penalty.79 
A lender typically protects itself against homeowner refinancing 
71 See 12 U.S.C. § 260l(a) (1976). 
" See 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1980). But see Panko v. Pan American Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 174 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1981), where the California Court of Appeals held that regard-
less of the FHLBB's stated intent to preempt state law, the regulation concerning due-
on clauses would not preempt California law because neither of the two traditional mea-
sures of preemption were present. Th~ court also stated that under all federally related 
loans the enforcement of the particular clause would normally rest upon conventional 
state coniract and property law. The same result was reached one month later by the 
California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District, in de la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n, 50 U.S.L.W. 2041 (Cal. App. July 2, 1981) . 
. •• See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 
(1973). 
•• But see 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (1980). 
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at lower interest rates by imposing prepayment penalties.80 If 
automatic enforcement is permitted, a lender can easily force 
the unsuspecting borrower to bargain himself into a position so 
precarious that a future sale becomes prohibitively expensive, 
regardless of the financing arrangement· utilized. Many cases 
allowing automatic enforcement of due-on-sale clauses have 
stressed the importance of such clauses in protecting the 
lender's legitimate interest in its security.81 In fact, automatic 
enforcement often allows lending institutions to use the clauses 
simply to increase their bargaining power with future borrowers. 
2. Proposed legislative response- The significant competing 
interests involved and the extensive tax ramifications which may 
result suggest a need for legislative intervention. Any legislation 
should incorporate a two-step approach. First, in order to en-
force any due-on clause, the lender would be required to show 
that its security would be impaired as a result of the transfer, 
either due to the uncreditworthiness of the transferee or some 
other relevant and objectively demonstrable factor. The legisla-
tion should include standards by which this determination 
would be made. If the lender were able to show impairment, it 
would be able to enforce the due-on clause and call the loan. 
Second, if the lender were unable to carry its burden, the lender 
would be required to consent to assumption or a continuation of 
the mortgage, but could raise the interest rate to a point halfway 
between the rate on the mortgage and the current rate for new 
loans. 
80 In First S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977), 
the mortgagee expressly conditioned approval of a buyer's assumption upon payment of 
a percentage finance charge or consent to an increased interest rate. The Alabama Court 
of Civil Appeals denied First Federal the right to use the acceleration clause as a means 
to impose these penalties upon the buyer, reasoning that "[t]he purpose of the clause 
was not being served by the threatened acceleration but the unrelated financial interest 
of the lender was the reason for the acceleration." Id. at 303. The court observed that 
exercising the acceleration right "is dependent upon the sale producing a threat to a 
legitimate interest of the mortgagee sought to be protected by the clause." Id. The Ala-
bama court then suggested, as had the California court in Tucker, that protection of the 
security from waste and depreciation, and the possible necessity of having to resort to 
the security after default, were legitimate interests entitling the mortgagee to accelerate. 
The court noted finally that its decision did not invalidate such clauses whenever the 
offered justification for enforcement was the lender's financial interest; rather, the court 
would require only that such a purpose clearly be bargained for by both parties when the 
clause was executed. See also Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. 
App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977) (holding a due-on clause to be an invalid restraint upon 
alienation when motivated solely by a mortgagee's desire to maintain its portfolio at 
current interest rates). 
•• See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 
(1975). 
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This proposal would aid lenders by insuring protection of 
their security while allowing an increase in their interest rate 
portfolio. Borrowers would benefit as well, because their ability 
to offer assumption at below market interest rates would mini-
mize the restraint on alienation. To be effective, such legislation 
would need to be at the federal level and apply to all banks. If 
enacted by the various states, each state could adopt its own 
version, preventing uniformity. More importantly, state legisla-
tion would have no effect on federally chartered banks, which 
hold the vast majority of mortgages.82 
CONCLUSION 
The WA mortgage is rapidly becoming a widely used financing 
technique for real estate. It is important for anyone using this 
technique to realize that the WA mortgage will be included in 
his depreciable basis. He must be aware, however, that the ex-
tent of its inclusion will be limited by the fair market value and 
economic useful life of the property, and by the allocation of the 
benefits and burdens of ownership. 
A more general concern is the effect of a due-on-sale or due-
on-encumbrance clause on a WA mortgage. The present state of 
the law provides little guidance either to lenders or borrower-
sellers. The enactment of federal legislation would eliminate 
much of this uncertainty, benefiting lenders and borrower-sellers 
alike. 
•• The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976), would be a 
~recedent for federal legislation in the real estate industry. 

